According to Bongaarts and Casterline, “… the median pace of change in sub-Saharan Africa (0.03 per year) is less than one-third the pace in the other regions [Asia and Latin America] (0.12 and 0.13, respectively).”10 Indeed, the behavior of fertility in sub-Saharan Africa is wholly at odds with the idea that economic progress determines the pace of fertility decline; as Bongaarts has shown, fertility rose when the region’s GDP/capita was relatively high in the 1970s, then began the onset of fertility decline in the early 1990s, when GDP/capita had fallen considerably, and then encountered a widespread stall in fertility decline in the 2000s, when GDP/capita had been rising more rapidly.11. Only Ghana, Botswana, and perhaps Tunisia are maintaining their path to stable democracy. The variation in the continent is too great. As late as 1980, sub-Saharan Africa had just 372 million people, and Africa as a whole had 480 million; at this time Asia had 2.6 billion people. Africa is also potentially a source of international risks in regard to climate change and disease. Africa’s unique high fertility regime will produce high rates of population growth in coming decades. He writes: Although there are other factors at work, in many developing countries, women who complete secondary school average at least one child fewer per lifetime than women who complete primary school only. Population growth Global population has increased by 2.9 billion over the past 35 years, from 4.4 billion in 1980 to 7.3 billion in 2015. John Bongaarts, summing up the experience of most developing regions, notes that “As societies modernize, economic and social changes such as industrialization, urbanization, new occupational structure, and increased education lead first to lower mortality and subsequently to a decline in fertility.”7 The puzzle as to why these changes have not produced lower fertility in Africa, as they have done elsewhere, has given rise to two main answers: First, it is true that Africa has not yet experienced the same increases in education, income, and other indices of modernization that have been seen in Asia and Latin America. But the large number of children is not a blessing for families. This paper will lay out the main aspects of Africa’s population dynamics in the coming decades, focusing on trends in mortality, fertility, population growth, labor force growth, and urbanization. That age structure still characterizes almost all of sub-Saharan Africa today. In either case, they are ill-placed to make demands about shaping family size. society. In other developing regions, a cluster of modernizing changes work in tandem, reinforcing changes that stretch out birth intervals and thus reduce fertility. In most developing countries, as women move into paid work outside the home—including young women with modest education—fertility is reduced as they have to choose between spending more time working and earning income and staying home to take care of their children. By the late 1970s, total fertility had fallen to four, and then by the early 2000s to well below three. After 2040, labor force age groups will be shrinking everywhere in the world, except in sub-Saharan Africa. That statistic has proven yet another reminder of the population boom in Africa’s most populous country. Otherwise, even a modest increase in Africa’s per capita emissions will make it impossible for more developed countries to make meaningful reductions in the world’s carbon loading. In Asia and Latin America, fertility was similar to that in Africa in the 1950s, with about six children born per woman during her lifetime. The differences—due to an expected decline in fertility that simply did not occur—are striking. By contrast, women’s employment has no significant effect at all on fertility, not through family size nor through birth intervals. Growth regions. In middle Africa, which had fertility of about six children per woman in the 1950s, fertility continued to rise all the way up through the late 1980s, reaching 6.76 in 1985––1990. Yet this is unsatisfactory for two reasons. Syria also was affected by climate change, as a severe drought disrupted rural areas and spurred urban migration. Thus, for Africa as a whole, fertility decline in the last five years was just 3.6%. The countries of the Middle East and North Africa, after rapid population growth and then progress in their demographic transition, enjoyed decades of economic growth and rapid educational expansion prior to the outburst of revolutions in 2010–2011. Much like China, Africa will likely disappoint as a consumer market, due to low per-capita incomes, distinctive local tastes, a large informal market, and high rates of savings to cope with an uncertain environment.51. In the model, the intermediate determinants are income (real GDP/capita), urbanization (percent urban), infant mortality, women’s employment (both for young women age 15–24 and all women), and women’s education. It would therefore make sense for the United States and Europe to plan on attracting more migrants from Africa to meet the needs of their aging and shrinking native populations. As a consequence, hundreds of millions of African citizens have become poor: one half of the African continent lives below the poverty line. If, say in 2025 a combination of climate disaster and civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (estimated population then of 104 million) or Ethiopia (126 million) or South Africa (62 million) broke out, might it also send millions of refugees streaming toward Europe? That is, Africa has invested mainly in primary education, leaving a great deficit in secondary education. Citing a study by Ahmed et al in 2016, Collinson says that this demographic dividend could account for 11-15% gross domestic product (GDP) growth by 2030 in many African countries, but that policies are needed to enhance the education and employability of young adults, as well as to create greater access to contraception and financial systems. While most will simply move to larger cities in their own country or to other countries in Africa or the Middle East, most who are surveyed say that their first choice of destinations is Europe or the United States But even if the number of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa to the United States and Europe were to double, or even triple, in the next three decades, the annual numbers would be less than 600,000 per year to Europe (out of a projected population of Western Europe in 2050 of 457 million, or 0.13 percent), and less than half that to the United States (or about 0.08 percent). Although the numbers in Table 2 are for female enrollments, those for men are not much better. Of these international migrants, about half of those living in the United States are from four countries: Nigeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Kenya. Indeed, the countries of East Asia benefitted from a “demographic dividend” during their period of rapid population growth.35 But this only occurred after three conditions were met: (1) Fertility continued to decline so that the dependency ratio—the number of children to be supported by working adults—fell. Higher urbanization is associated with higher women’s education and employment, in much the same magnitude of effect in Africa as in other developing regions. The world population is growing at an alarming rate. In sub-Saharan Africa, by contrast, women’s education is absolutely central, as it is the most important driver of changes in birth intervals and a strong direct factor in reducing desired family size. Almost all of them will be converging on cities, looking for a better life than they had in the countryside. Rapid progress in reducing fertility could only have a major impact in the second half of this century. Ageing population . Africa today includes giant countries with populations near or exceeding 100 million (Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria) and tiny countries with populations under 1 million (Comoros, Djibouti, Cabo Verde, Reunion, Mayotte, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles). What does this constant growth mean? However, fertility remains high in most cases, even in countries where fertility decline has been rapid. World Population Day, which took place on the 11th July, focused on enabling the youth with the necessary skills to reach their potential and economic growth. The United States will need an additional one million immigrants per year for the next 35 years just to get back to the 2050 population that was expected a decade ago! UN population projections for Africa’s largest and fastest growing countries in millions, FASTEST GROWING COUNTRIES (Not Already Shown Above), To be sure, vigorous programs of state-led family planning, coupled with increased education, could bend these curves. The proximate determinants are desired family size and birth interval, which together shape total fertility.20, In the path model, positive effects are shown by red arrows, negative effects by blue ones, with the strength of the effect shown by the thickness of the arrow. But where will 200 million additional city-dwellers go? The population growth rate has been slowing, however, from peak annual rates in excess of 2 percent in the late 1960s, to about 1 percent currently, to half that by 2050. The latter risks were brought home with the outbreak of Ebola in the United States in 2014. Economic growth in many countries cannot keep up, poverty is on the rise. Rising incomes lead to lower infant mortality, and have a direct effect on increasing birth intervals, thus reducing fertility. In Niger in 1998, for example, women who completed secondary education had 31% fewer children (on average, 4.6 per lifetime) than those who completed only primary education (6.7). In regard to climate change, much of the world’s fate depends on what happens in Africa. The population of Africa has grown rapidly over the past century and consequently shows a large youth bulge, further reinforced by a low life expectancy of below 50 years in some African countries. Nigeria, by these projections, will be more populous than the United States by 2050 and by 2100 have more people than all of Europe. First, northern and southern Africa did in fact follow the pattern of other regions, as would be expected; it is only eastern, middle, and western Africa that have not done so. Yet the commodity boom explains only part of Africa’s broader growth story. As is clear, while considerable progress has been made in female primary education, there is a substantial gap when it comes to female’s secondary education. Women’s employment—whether for young women or for all women—has no significant impact at all! The finding that education was the most consistently significant factor supports the suggestion by Goujon, Lutz, and Samir that Africa’s “fertility stall” reflects a lack of progress in educational attainments.17, In Figure 2, I show a path model for the determinants of fertility in developing countries excluding sub-Saharan Africa. For middle and low income females in sub-Saharan Africa, according to an assessment of DHS survey data in 2008, participation of female teens in secondary school was less than ten percent.24, For women, it appears that secondary education is the critical arena for reducing fertility. This does not mean that none of these states will become democratic; but it does mean that for the next two decades, it is most likely that some 80–90% of African states will remain, or revert back to, autocracies, with recurrent waves of violent conflict.48. Africa’s CO2 output per person is thus a mere 1.1 tons per year. While this decline is welcome, it must be remembered that even at an annual growth rate of 2.3%, total population doubles every 30 years. Population growth rates continue to pose lingering challenges to development efforts on the continent. Tropical Africa thus commonly has extended families with widespread polygyny and large desired family size, all of which facilitate women working outside the home. If all of Africa were to accelerate its fertility decline to the rates achieved by Kenya, Rwanda and Ethiopia, of 13–15% per year, then Africa’s total population would only reach 3.1 billion instead of 4.5 billion by 2100.31 Yet the change to mid-century would be modest; the UN “low fertility” variant projection still forecasts an African population of 2.3 billion by 2050 (instead of 2.5 billion in the “medium variant”). The new “high variants” have been similarly adjusted upwards. As Hertrich has explained, changing Africa’s high fertility will require changing the conditions that both lead to higher desired family sizes and weaken women’s ability to assert their preferences if they desire fewer children.59 That means empowering women through later marriage and greater education. Why shouldn’t African labor be viewed similarly? (See Figure 3). The great difficulty is whether there will be jobs for those who move to the cities. Yet that would be a tragic mistake. Fertility rates in African countries with the highest and lowest rates of fertility change, 2005–2010 to 2010–2015, excluding small island states. Offended by one-sided coverage of wars, disasters and disease, the founders of created a website that provides a balanced view of Africa – current events, business, arts & culture, travel, fashion, sports, information, development, and more. This will have two components: labor migration and refugee movements. Yet they also exhibited a huge increase in youth population and urbanization, severely unequal distribution of the benefits of growth, high degrees of corruption and political exclusion, and struggled to keep up with prior commitments to subsidize food prices, fuel, and government employment. There is also great potential for Western countries to help themselves, as well as Africa, by treating the surge of young people in Africa as an opportunity rather than a threat. In sum, Africa is different. In northern and southern Africa, fertility began a steady decline. In southern Africa, where fertility was six children per woman in the 1960s, the level fell to four in the late 1980s and down to 2.71 in 2005–2010. The “demographic window” for favorable development opens approximately when the population under age 15 falls below 30% of the total population, and the proportion of people 65 and older is still under 15%. This is based on data available from Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) for 31 countries at various time intervals from 1991 through 2013, making up 88 observations.18 The model follows the distinction made by Guegant and May between intermediate determinants of fertility, which are mainly socioeconomic conditions that influence fertility indirectly, and proximate determinants of fertility, which are mainly biological and behavioral and influence fertility directly.19 The intermediate determinants exert their influence on fertility through their effect on the proximate determinants. advancing ideas defining a free In the coming decades, Africa will have by far the fastest growing population anywhere in the world and will soon be the only fast-growing source of one of the most precious resources on the planet—young people. A growing population with disparitites in distribution can add strain to the environment to feed people. If done in an orderly way, this volume of migration is not a threat. A fast-growing population and labor force could be a boon to the economy. The UN report predicts that the number of people aged 60 and over will more than triple by 2100, accounting for 3.1 billion people. Adepoju also states that remittances received by the migrated worker have been increasing notably and are a lifeline for poor relations left behind as they are able to pay for basic services such as healthcare, education and to enhance agricultural production. Two and a half years ago, Zambia was one of Africa’s most stable democracies, a place so functional that it rarely made international headlines. Africa has plenty of scope to increase its agricultural productivity and release workers for manufacturing and service jobs. Conversely, the community of supporters in By 2030 this number is expected to increase to 8.6 billion and eventually 11.2 billion by 2100. Africa will likely remain, overall, an economic pygmy among giants. Moreover, such secondary education as is provided goes mainly to boys, with girls having a significant gap. At present, due to its poverty and mainly rural population, Africa is a trivial generator of greenhouse gases. Content is produced in collaboration between’s editorial team and our partners — including nongovernmental organizations, private sector stakeholders, agencies and institutions. If in fact fertility remains as high as 3.5 children per woman in 2050 and 2.65 in 2100, which is the UN “high variant” scenario, then Africa’s total population would soar to 2.8 billion by 2050 and 6.2 billion by 2100. By 2050, Africa’s 1.1 billion person population is slated to double, with 80% of this growth happening in cities, bringing the continent’s urban headcount up to more than 1.3 billion. But Africa’s CO2 output per person has been growing fast, much faster than its population. Some African countries are highly urbanized, with urban populations around 60% of their total (South Africa, Angola, Botswana), while others are barely urbanized at all, with urban populations less than 20% (Burundi, Ethiopia, Malawi, Niger, Rwanda, Uganda). One of the most vexing questions for the framers of the Constitution was how to create a vigorous and independent executive without making him king. Natural resources, and the related government spending they financed, generated just 32 percent of Africa’s GDP growth from 2000 through 2008.2 2.Resources contributed 24 percent o… Yet in Africa, a wholly different pattern developed. In an essay by Aderanti Adepoju of the World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on Migration Human Resources Development Centre, Adepoju says that the distinctive features of migration include increasing female migration, diversification of migration destinations, transformation of labour flows into commercial migration, and emigration of skilled health and other professionals. A different and more pragmatic approach to migration would be to view the vast numbers of young workers in Africa as an untapped resource. For Africa as a whole (and sub-Saharan Africa as well), infant mortality has fallen by 29% in just the last decade, from 2000–2005 to 2010–2015. For Africa as a whole, life expectancy in the 1950s was less than 40 years, not much different from Europe in the 1700s. We have already noted that Africa is likely to remain a continent of politically fragile states, mainly autocracies with chronic violence. Most African countries are thus decades away from reaching the age structures favorable to sustaining democratic rule.47, Aside from the small island states of Mauritius, Reunion, and the Seychelles (median age 35), as of 2015 no countries in Africa except for Tunisia (31) had reached a median age of 30. Only very few countries have fertility declining at double-digit rates over this period. In the coming decades, the number of travelers from sub-Saharan Africa to other continents, driven by increased population and higher incomes in Africa, is likely to increase by three or four times. It will be a major concern for developed regions to contain the spread of violence and extremism from Africa, just as in recent decades it has been a concern to contain the spread of these tendencies from North Africa and the Middle East. But for all other African states, with median age of 22 or less, the probability of achieving stable democracy is 10–20%. If we focus on new entrants to the labor force, youth aged 15–24, by just 2040 sub-Saharan Africa will have well over twice the youth population of China, half again more than India, and almost three times the youth of the United States and Europe combined.33, Fundamental to the future of labor productivity in both Africa and the world will be the productivity of this massive increase in workers. The UN projects that by 2050–55, average lifespans in Africa (and sub-Saharan Africa) will reach 70 years, a dramatic convergence with other world regions.3. These countries have suffered the combined loss of more than 14.5 million people. Ideally, African countries would invest in secondary education—this would increase the skill level of workers and accelerate the decline in fertility. These gains in life expectancy are mainly due to dramatic declines in infant mortality. Path Model for Fertility in Sub-Saharan African Countries, Figure 4. What are the prospects for a major increase in migration from these and other countries? By contrast, thirty-two nations in Africa have fertility of 4.5 or higher, including giant countries like Nigeria (5.74) and Ethiopia (4.63), and extremely high fertility countries like Niger (7.4), Somalia (6.6), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (6.4), Chad (6.3) and Burundi (6.0). Helping Africa to develop those youth as productive contributors to their own and the global economy, and managing Africa’s future energy transition to minimize its impact on climate, will be the vital tasks for global security and prosperity in the coming century. © 2020 by the Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University. The most populous African … The largest of those effects are through women’s employment, both for young women and total women. The UN medium variant projection generally assumes that countries with higher fertility will shift to a more rapid decline in coming years. While this explanation would account for the low rate of fertility decline observed in Africa, and even the rise in fertility observed from the 1950s to the 1970s, it too has difficulties. Numerous scholars have demonstrated that states with large youth bulges and sustained population growth suffer from a variety of political pressures.42 Whether it is the difficulties of providing jobs, affordable food, adequate housing, controlling inflation, or policing sprawling cities, governments are hard pressed to be responsive to the needs of rapidly growing populations, often falling into debt through the costs of subsidies and bloated government payrolls. The population of Africa is expected to roughly double by 2050. But it remains to be seen if this can keep up with the forecast urban growth. It then began a slow decline but still remains at nearly five in 2010––2015. To date, sub-Saharan Africa has been a modest contributor to global labor migration. Table 2. As demographers Jean-Pierre Guengant and John F. May have observed, “This pattern of persisting high levels of fertility in the majority of African countries differs markedly from what has been observed in other developing countries since 1960.”5 Yet as population expert John Casterline recently observed, “there is nothing approaching consensus on the sources of this difference.”6. Whether it is the hundreds of military coups that have taken place in African countries since independence, or the civil wars and genocides that swept across central, west Africa and Algeria in the 1990s and the multiple rebellions that have occurred in western Africa since 2000, the continent has been a byword for political instability. It will also be the source of virtually all labor force growth in the world, and by far the youngest region, in the 21st century. During the 30 years from 1975 to 2005 when its population doubled, Bangladesh had only modest growth in per capita income and struggled with coups and unstable government. This would kick off a virtuous circle in which, as fertility fell, more money could be invested per student and worker, raising productivity further and leading to sustained and rapid economic growth. Although age structures in most countries in East Asia, the Caribbean and Latin America matured significantly over this three-decade period and many countries in these regions moved into more advanced age structures, the likelihood that countries with very young age structures would experience civil conflict actually increased in each decade from the 1970s to the 1990s.45. These are the only large regions of the world where, even after decades of falling mortality, fertility remains at or above five children per woman.4. From 2010 to 2017, Europe received nearly one million asylum applications from sub-Saharan Africans who reached its shores, more than half of them in the three years 2015–2017; the United States received fewer, about 400,000 from 2010 to 2016. Ten countries in Africa with recent population projections were selected for Figures 1 and 2. Africa Niger: sleepwalking into huge population growth. The population of Mexico City in 1960 was around 5,000,000; it was estimated to be about 17,000,000 in 1985 and was projected to reach 26,000,000 to 31,000,000 by 2000. Altogether, there are an estimated 4.15 million sub-Saharan Africans living in Europe in 2017 and 1.55 million in the United States55. Indeed, the new 2018 “medium variant” forecasts are closer to the 2010 “high variant” forecasts, and sometimes exceed them. Other articles where Population growth is discussed: Kenya: Demographic trends: Kenya’s accelerating population growth from the early 1960s to the early 1980s seriously constrained the country’s social and economic development. As we have just seen, in most developing countries women’s education has a far smaller impact on fertility than women’s employment; only in sub-Saharan Africa is it the other way around. How is this possible? Second, even for the latter regions, the rate and amount of their fertility decline is not comparable to what happened in other developing regions at similar levels of income and development. Women who leave school after primary education, which ends at age 12, are readily available for very early marriage and have no distinctive skills that allow them to be more productive or stand up to their husbands. Collinson, who will be speaking at the Africa Health Congress 2018 at Gallagher Estate today (29 May) says that this demographic dividend is a potential developmental gain created by window of time where fertility has fallen for several years but the ageing population has not yet risen significantly. As an example, there are many countries in Africa whose growth rate is higher than India. To understand future fertility in Africa, we thus need to take a closer look at its progress in education. In 2016, Africa as a whole emitted 1.33 million metric tons of carbon dioxide, less than Russia by itself. Yet Africa has, despite substantial increases in education in recent decades, apparently invested in the wrong kind of education for fertility reduction. Populations, but that is to be women ’ s youth population in... 2011 to 24 % in, among others, Rwanda, Congo, and low-productivity and low-income work—unless changes.34. 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